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All-American Canal Project Sparks Test 
Case for Transboundary Groundwater Law 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 17, 1988, the United States Congress authorized 
the u.s. Secretary of the Interior to construct a concrete lining 
on a sixty-six mile section of the All-American Canal (lining proj-
ect).l The State of California proposed the lining project as a 
conservation measure to bolster southern California's water sup-
ply. The lining project is designed to prevent large quantities of 
Colorado River water from seeping into Mexico through the 
earthen walls of the canal. 2 Because the canal is located just north 
of the Mexican border,3 the water that seeps through its walls 
flows underground into Mexico and becomes a source of ground-
water for Mexican farmers in the Valle de Mexicali region (see 
Figure 1).4 
The lining project has sparked a controversy between the 
United States and Mexico. The Mexican Government claims that 
the project violates international law.5 The U.S. Government, 
however, claims that the water in the All-American Canal is U.S. 
water and that the U.S. Government has the right to implement 
projects to conserve it.6 The two governments have referred the 
1 San Luis Rey Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-675, 
§ 201, 102 Stat. 4000, 4005-4011 (1988) [hereinafter All-American Canal Lining Legis-
lation]. See New York Times, Oct. 1, 1989, at 3. 
2 New York Times, Oct. 1, 1989, at 3; Press Release from Coachella Valley Water 
District (Sep. 26, 1990) (discussing approval of new funds for experimental canal lining 
program) [hereinafter CVWD Press Release]. See infra, text accompanying notes 95-99 
for a description of the lining project's design concept. 
3 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, PROJECT DATA 1 (1981) [hereinafter PROJECT DATA]. The 
All-American canal carries water from the Colorado River in a southwesterly direction 
through the sand dunes and desert mesas running just north of the Mexican border. See 
infra, text accompanying notes 8-14. 
4 See infra, text accompanying note 101. 
5 New York Times, Oct. 1, 1989, at 3. The Mexican Government initially claimed that 
the United States violated Minute 242 which requires the United States to consult with 
Mexico prior to developing new projects in the border area that might adversely affect 
Mexico. See Colorado River Salinity Agreement Between the United States of America 
and Mexico, Aug. 30,1973,24 U.S.T. 1968, T.I.A.S. No. 7708 [hereinafter Minute 242]. 
6 New York Times, Oct. 1, 1989, at 3. 
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dispute to the International Boundary and Water Commission 
(IBWC)7 for exchange of technical information. 
This Comment examines the issues of international law that 
arise from the lining project conflict. Part I presents the back-
ground of the conflict by discussing the competing claims for 
Colorado River water. Part II discusses the concept and design 
of the All-American Canal system and the lining project. Part III 
analyzes principles of international law that apply to the lining 
project dispute. Part IV suggests how an international tribunal 
might resolve the conflict. This Comment concludes that an in-
ternational tribunal would grant Mexico the right to use some of 
the water in dispute pursuant to developing principles of custom-
ary international law. 
I. BACKGROUND: COMPETING CLAIMS TO THE COLORADO RIVER 
An international river,S the Colorado flows generally in a 
southwesterly direction through 1,300 miles of the western 
United States before entering Mexico. One section of the river 
forms 24 miles of the international border.9 The Colorado River 
passes through the states of Wyoming, Nevada, Colorado, Ari-
zona, New Mexico, and California.1O The river's path cuts 
through large mountain ranges and, together with its tributar-
ies, 1J drains 242,000 square miles of land. 12 This drainage basin 
7 A treaty between the United States and Mexico created the International Boundary 
Commission (IBC) in 1889. The Convention of 1889, Mar. 1, 1889, United States-Mexico, 
art. I, 26 Stat. 1512, T.S. No. 232. A treaty between the United States and Mexico in 1944 
changed the name of the IBC to its present name, International Boundary and Water 
Commission (IBWC). Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of 
the Rio Grande, Feb. 3,1944, United States-Mexico, art. 2,59 Stat. 1219 (1945), T.S. No. 
994, at art. 2 [hereinafter 1944 Treaty]. The IBWC consists of a U.S. Section and a 
Mexican Section. The Commissioner of each Section must be an engineer and each 
Commissioner functions under the foreign policy supervision of the Foreign Office of his 
government. See INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION, THE INTERNATIONAL 
BOUNDARY, UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, 1 (1987) [hereinafter IBWC PAPER]. 
8 The term international river refers to rivers that either cross two or more States 
(successive international rivers) or serve to demarcate States (contiguous international 
rivers). FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL WATER RESOURCES 4 (1980) [hereinafter FAO]. 
9 See IBWC PAPER, supra note 7, at 1. 
to Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 552 (1962). 
II The major tributaries are the Green, the Yampa, the White, the Gunnison, the San 
Juan, the Little Colorado, and the Gila. Getches, Competing Demands for the Colorado River, 
56 COLO. L. REV. 413, 413 (1985). 
12 The area drained by the Colorado River and its tributaries is approximately 900 
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is extremely arid and depends on Colorado River water to be 
productive and habitable. 13 
On the Mexican side of the border, the Colorado River passes 
through the state of Baja California Norte and empties into the 
Gulf of California. 14 Baja California Norte, Mexico's fastest grow-
ing state, contains two important cities, Tijuana and Mexicali, as 
well as one of Mexico's most fertile agricultural areas, Valle de 
Mexicali. 
Historically, the Colorado River has been a source of conflict 
among the several U.S. states and between the United States and 
Mexico. 15 These sovereign users of the river settled most of these 
conflicts by developing the Law of the River. 
The Law of the River is a set of interstate compacts,16 federal 
statutes,17 treaties,18 and U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 19 The 
Law of the River effectively allocates all of the surface water of 
the Colorado River.20 It does not, however, govern use of the 
groundwater that has its source in the Colorado River. This Sec-
tion discusses the Law of the River as it apportions Colorado 
River water among the several U.S. states and between the United 
States and Mexico. 
A. Domestic Apportionment of Colorado River Water 
In 1921, the U.S. Congress authorized the Colorado River basin 
states (basin states) to negotiate and enter into a compact for the 
"equitable division and apportionment ... of the water supply 
of the Colorado River."21 Because the basin states were not able 
miles long from north to south and 300-500 miles wide from east to west. Arizona v. 
California, 373 U.S. at 552. This drainage basin is equal to nearly one-twelfth of the area 
of the continental United States. 
13 [d. 
14 New York Times, Oct. 1, 1989, at 3. 
15 Getches, supra note 11, at 414. 
16 See, e.g., Colorado River Compact, 42 Stat. 171, 70 Congo Rec. 324 (1928) [hereinafter 
Compact]. 
17 See, e.g., Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1929, 46 Stat. 3000,43 U.S.C.S. § 617 (1929) 
[hereinafter Project Act]. 
18 See, e.g., 1944 Treaty, supra note 7. 
19 See, e.g., Arizona V. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1962). 
20 Getches, supra note 11, at 414. 
21 42 Stat. 171 (1921), as cited in Arizona V. California, 373 U.S. at 556-57 & n.19. 
The authorization for the Compact was required by article 1, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution, 
which provides, "[n]o state shall, without the consent of Congress, ... enter into any 
Agreement or Compact with another State .... " 
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to agree on each state's share of the water, Secretary of Commerce 
Herbert Hoover suggested a compromise solution that divided 
the Colorado River basin into two parts-the Upper Basin and 
the Lower Basin. 22 This compromise became the basis for the 
Colorado River Compact (Compact).23 
The Compact is the heart of the Law of the River.24 The basin 
states intended the Compact to apportion an average of 7,500,000 
acre-feet of water25 per year to each basin. 26 Because the Lower 
Basin was more developed than the Upper Basin, the Compact 
allows the Lower Basin to use any water that the Upper Basin 
cannot use. 27 The Compact includes a provision for future deliv-
eries of Colorado River water to Mexico. 28 Although the United 
States and Mexico had not reached an agreement on Mexican 
rights to Colorado River water at the time the states signed the 
Compact,29 the Compact provides that the two basins are to share 
equally in any future burdens to deliver water to Mexico.3D 
In 1929, Congress passed the Boulder Canyon Project Ad 
(Project Act).31 The Project Act approved the Compact's appor-
tionment of water between the two basins and authorized the 
individual states to allocate the water within the basins. The Proj-
ect Act also authorized the Secretary of the Interior to construct, 
operate, and maintain a dam and other works to control floods, 
improve navigation, regulate the river's flow, store and distribute 
22 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 557. The Upper and Lower Basins are separated 
at Lee Ferry, which is a point on the river located in northern Arizona. The Upper Basin 
consists of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and New Mexico. Getches, supra note II, at 417. 
The Lower Basin consists of Arizona, California, and New Mexico. 
23 See Compact, supra note 16. 
24 Abbot, California Colorado River Issues, 19 PAC. L.J. 1391, 1394 (1988). 
25 One acre-foot of water is approximately 325,851 gallons, or enough to cover one 
acre of land with one foot of water. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 557 n.22. In the 
California region between San Diego and Ventura, one acre-foot of water supplies the 
average annual requirements of two households. CVWD Press Release, supra note 2. 
26 Compact, supra note 16, at art. III(a). See Getches, supra note II, at 417. In addition, 
the Lower Basin is allowed to consume an extra 1,000,000 acre-feet per year when the 
flows allow. Getches, supra note II, at 417. 
27 Compact, supra note 16, at art. III(e). See Getches, supra note II, at 417-18. 
28 Compact, supra note 16, at art. III(c). 
2" The United States and Mexico did not sign the treaty apportioning the Colorado 
River waters until 1944. See 1944 Treaty, supra note 7. 
30 Compact, supra note 16, at art. III(c). According to the Compact, the water to be 
delivered to Mexico must first be supplied from surplus waters. When the surplus proves 
to be insufficient, the burden is to be shared equally between the Upper and Lower 
Basins. 
31 See Project Act, supra note 17. 
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waters for beneficial uses, and generate electrical power.32 One 
of the projects authorized by the Project Act was the construction 
of the All-American Cana}.33 
In order for the Project Act to become effective, California 
had to agree to limit its use of Colorado River water.34 The 
California legislature passed a law restricting the state's use of 
the Lower Basin's apportionment to a maximum of 4,400,000 
acre-feet per year.35 Additionally, California restricted itself to 
using no more than one half of any surplus waters unapportioned 
by the Compact. 
The Project Act also required persons interested in using Col-
orado River water to first enter into a contract with the Secretary 
of the Interior.36 Accordingly, on August 18, 1931, the Secretary 
of the Interior signed the Seven Party Agreement authorizing 
delivery of Colorado River water for use in CaliforniaY The 
agreement sets priorities on each party's right to use the water.38 
In California, agricultural interests received the highest priority. 
Pursuant to the authorization in the Project Act, the Upper 
and Lower Basins allocated each individual state's share of Col-
orado River water. The Upper Basin signed the Upper Colorado 
River Basin Compact.39 This agreement gave each Upper Basin 
state a certain percentage share of the Upper Basin's apportion-
ment.40 
32 Project Act, supra note 17, at § 617. 
33 Abbott, supra note 24, at 1399. 
34 Project Act, supra note 17, at § 617 c. Section 617 c of the Project Act required either 
unanimous ratification of the Compact by the basin states or ratification by at least six 
basin states, including California, together with California legislation limiting its share of 
Colorado River water to 4.4 million acre-feet per year. Arizona refused to ratify the 
Compact so California enacted the California Limitation Act to meet the requirements of 
§ 617c. See infra note 35. 
35 See California Limitation Act, Cal. Stat. ch. 16, sec. 1 at 38-9 (1929), as cited in 
Abbot, supra note 24, at 1389. 
36 The Project Act states: "[n)o person shall have or be entitled to have the use for any 
purpose of the water stored ... [behind the Hoover Dam) except by contract [made with 
the Secretary of the Interior). Project Act, supra note 17, at § 671d. 
37 Abbott, supra, note 24, at 1401-03. The agricultural interests of the Palo Verde 
Irrigation District, the Yuma Project, the Imperial Irrigation District, and the Coachella 
VaHey Water District were allotted 3,850,000 acre-feet per year. The next two priorities, 
totaling 1,212,000 acre-feet per year, went to the Metropolitan Water District of Southern 
California (MWD), and the remaining water was apportioned for agricultural use. 
38 [d. at 1402-03. 
39 Upper Colorado Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31, 33 (1949). 
40 [d. at art. 1. 
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The states of the Lower Basin, however, were not immediately 
able to agree on a division of the Lower Basin's share.41 After 
years of intense litigation and dispute, the U.S. Supreme Court 
finally resolved the issue.42 The Court held that the Project Act 
effectively allocated the Lower Basin's apportionment of Colo-
rado River waters among the individual basin states. Therefore, 
California was entitled to 4.4 million acre-feet per year, Arizona 
was entitled to 2.8 million acre-feet per year, and New Mexico 
was entitled to 300,000 acre-feet per year. In addition, Arizona 
and California were each to get one half of any surplus flows. 
The Court's decision finally clarified the issue of apportionment 
of the Colorado River between the Lower Basin states. 
B. International Apportionment of Colorado River Water 
Because the Colorado River is an international river, the United 
States and Mexico have signed agreements relating to both ap-
portionment and quality of the water. For purposes of this Com-
ment, the most important agreements are the treaty entitled Uti-
lization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the 
Rio Grande (1944 Treaty),43 and Minute 242.44 This Section pro-
vides a brief description of each of these agreements. 
1. The 1944 Treaty 
On February 3, 1944, the United States and Mexico signed the 
1944 Treaty to apportion the waters of the Colorado River.45 The 
treaty guarantees that the United States will deliver a quantity of 
41 Getches. supra note II, at 418. The Lower Basin states were not able to reach an 
agreement and sign a compact as authorized by the Project Act primarily because Arizona 
adamantly refused to include its Gila River waters as part of the apportionment of 
Colorado River water. The Gila River is a tributary of the Colorado River that flows 
through Arizona and New Mexico and can only be effectively used by Arizona. Arizona 
claimed that its economy depended on exclusive use of the Gila River and that the Project 
Act did not give California any claim to share these waters. The Supreme Court agreed 
with Arizona and held that the Project Act was not intended to include the tributary 
waters of the other Lower Basin states. See generally Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 
(1962). The Court held that the Project Act only apportioned the mainstream waters of 
the Colorado River. 
42 Arizona v. California. 373 U.S. 546, 565 (1962). 
43 1944 Treaty, supra note 7. 
44 Minute 242. supra note 5. 
45 1944 Treaty, supra note 7. See IBWC PAPER, supra note 7, at 3. 
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1,500,000 acre-feet of Colorado River water per year to Mexico.46 
The 1944 Treaty entrusts the IBWC to apply the treaty, to reg-
ulate and exercise the rights and obligations assumed thereunder 
by the United States and Mexico, and to settle disputes that arise 
under the treatyY 
The 1944 Treaty originated with a series of negotiations be-
tween the United States and Mexico beginning in the 1920s.48 
During this time, the basin states drafted the Colorado River 
Compact which referred to the possibility of a future treaty with 
Mexico.49 In addition, the United States and Mexico each ap-
pointed three Commissioners to the International Water Com-
mission (IWC) to secure information on which to base a treaty 
apportioning the use of the Colorado River and the Rio Grande.50 
The Commissioners quickly reached an impasse when the 
United States offered to apportion 750,000 acre-feet per year to 
Mexico and Mexico demanded 3,600,000 acre-feet per year. 51 In 
1932, Congress abolished the IWC and transferred the authority 
to negotiate a river treaty with Mexico to the International 
Boundary Commission (IBC).52 
Negotiations between the United States and Mexico continued 
sporadically throughout the 1930s and early 1940s with little 
progress.53 A U.S. offer in 1942 to deliver to Mexico 1,150,000 
acre-feet of Colorado River water per year initiated a new round 
of negotiations.54 Mexico rejected the offer and stated that 
2,000,000 acre-feet per year was the absolute minimum amount 
of water it needed for the region. 55 
46 1944 Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 10. The treaty provides that the United States will 
deliver the water according to schedules formulated by Mexico within certain limitations. 
Id. at art. 15. The treaty also authorizes Mexico to construct a main diversion structure 
below the point of diversion. Id. at art. 12(a). In addition, the treaty permits the United 
States to construct such works that it might need to protect its land from floods and 
seepage that might result from the construction. Id. at art. 12(b)-(c). 
47 Id. at art. 2. 
48 See generally Meyers and Noble, The Colorado River: The Treaty with Mexico, 19 STAN. 
L. REV. 357 (1967). This article provides an authoritative and detailed account of the 
negotiation and drafting of the 1944 Treaty. 
49 See Compact, supra note 16, at art. III(c). 
50 Meyers and Noble, supra note 48, at 368. Mexico refused to discuss one river without 
the other because this placed Mexico in a better bargaining position. 
51 Id. 
5. Id. at 369. 
53 Id. at 369-83. 
54 See Id. at 376. This response was based on the assumption that the annual flow of 
the Colorado River was approximately 19,000,000 acre-feet per year. 
55 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INT. LAW 872, 949-50 (1968). 
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An important development during these negotiations was the 
U.S. Government's refusal to apply the Harmon Doctrine.56 The 
Harmon Doctrine stated that a sovereign had the right to appro-
priate all of the water of an international river within its jurisdic-
tion. By refusing to apply the Harmon Doctrine, the U.S. Gov-
ernment rejected the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty 
and adopted a more "internationalist" approach. 57 As a practical 
matter, the United States could not apply the Harmon Doctrine 
to the Colorado River because Mexico is upstream for two thirds 
of the Lower Rio Grande and the United States did not want to 
jeopardize this source of water. Agreeing to an equitable appor-
tionment of Mexico's share of Colorado River water, however, 
remained a problem. 
In the 1944 Treaty, the two governments finally agreed that 
Mexico would receive an allotment of 1,500,000 acre-feet per 
year from the United States.58 The 1944 Treaty does not mention 
the effect of Mexican uses of groundwater reserves, despite their 
interrelation with the surface flow of the Colorado River. 59 Evi-
dently, the negotiators did not consider whether the United States 
should be given credit for the groundwater that Mexico utilized.60 
As a result, the water that seeps through the All-American Canal 
is the subject of dispute between the United States and Mexico. 
2. Minute 242-The Salinity Control Agreement 
Between the years 1965 and 1973, a dispute arose between the 
United States and Mexico concerning salinity levels of the waters 
delivered to Mexico.61 During the 1960s, the salinity level of the 
Colorado River reached crisis proportions because of a combi-
56 [d. at 950. 
57 See Memorandum of the Legal Advisor of the Department of State, dated May 26, 
1942, as cited in M. WHITEMAN, supra note 55, at 950. 
58 1944 Treaty, supra note 7, at art. lO(a). Article 10 of the 1944 Treaty states: "[o]f 
the waters of the Colorado River, from any and all sources, there are alloted to Mexico: 
... [a] guaranteed annual quantity of 1,500,000 acre-feet .... " Article 10 also provides 
that Mexico can not acquire any right to water used for any purpose in excess of the 
1,500,000 acre-feet guaranteed by the United States. 
59 Meyers and Noble, supra note 48, at 415. 
60 [d. at 385. 
61 See generally Bulson, Colorado River Salinity Problem: Has a Solution Been Found?, 9 
INT'L LAw. 283 (1975). 
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nation of natural factors and U.S. use of the water for irrigation. 52 
By the time the waters of the Colorado River reached Mexico, 
they had become highly saline and almost unusable. 
The United States claimed that it was not liable for damage 
caused by the high salinity levels because the 1944 Treaty did not 
require that the water delivered to Mexico be of any certain 
quality. 53 Indeed, the language of the treaty offered little support 
for the Mexican position that the water be of a minimum quality. 
Mexico claimed that the preamble of the 1944 Treaty implied 
that the water be usable. In addition, Mexico argued that because 
the treaty listed "agriculture and growing" as one of the principle 
uses for the water,54 the delivery of unusable water undermined 
the purpose of the 1944 Treaty, and was therefore illegal. 
It is important to note that despite the weakness of Mexico's 
position in terms of positive international law, Mexico probably 
would have prevailed if the case were submitted to an interna-
tional tribunal. 55 Perhaps this is the reason that the United States 
negotiated a series of agreements with Mexico through the IBWC 
to solve the salinity problem.55 These agreements culminated in 
the signing of Minute 242.57 
Point 6 of Minute 242 requires the United States to consult 
with Mexico before undertaking any new development of either 
surface or groundwater. 58 Pursuant to Point 6, the United States 
is currently exchanging technical information with Mexico con-
cerning the lining project dispute.59 
62 Bulson, supra note 61. at 284-85. The natural factors contributing to the high salinity 
level include arid soil collecting salts due to lack of rainfall and runoff water carrying 
dissolved minerals into the Colorado River. The U.S. use of the waters for irrigation, 
however, greatly accelerated the natural collection of dissolved materials. In addition, the 
Welton-Mohawk irrigation project in Arizona pumped salty groundwater into the river 
causing salinity levels to rise drastically. 
63 Id. at 286. Assistant Secretary of State Acheson interpreted articles 10 and II of the 
1944 Treaty to allow the United States credit for water delivered to Mexico even though 
it was so saline as to be unusable. Minute 242 effectively discredits this interpretation of 
the 1944 Treaty. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 55, at 962-63. 
64 Bulson, supra note 61, at 286-87. 
65 Id. at 290. 
66 Id. at 291. These agreements include Minute 218, signed on March 22. 1965, Minute 
241 signed on July 14, 1972, and Minute 242, signed on August 30, 1973. These agree-
ments provide for the construction of a drainage channel from the Welton-Mohawk 
project and for release of fresh water to dilute the salinity level. 
67 See Bulson, supra note 61, at 292. 
68 See Minute 242, supra note 5, at Point 6. 
69 Letter from Reinaldo Martinez of the IBWC to John Coghlin (Dec. 27, 1989) 
[hereinafter IBWC Letter]. 
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II. THE ALL-AMERICAN CANAL SYSTEM AND THE LINING PROJECT 
A. The All-American Canal System 
The All-American Canal system is part of a diversion system 
authorized by the Project Act in 1929. The diversion system 
consists of the 80 mile All-American Canal, the 123 mile Coach-
ella Canal, appurtenant structures, and the Imperial Diversion 
Dam and Desilting Works.70 The first irrigation water was deliv-
ered through the All-American Canal in 1940.71 
The All-American Canal was designed to replace the Alamo 
Canal in order to irrigate the Imperial Valley with water from 
the Colorado River.72 As an international canal traveling through 
the United States and Mexico, the Alamo Canal proved difficult 
to operate, especially without upstream control of the Colorado 
River. Therefore, Congress authorized a study to determine the 
feasibility of constructing a canal entirely within the United States. 
Eventually, the information was compiled in the Fall-Davis report 
which recommended a reservoir project at or near Boulder Can-
yon, a diversion dam and desilting works, and a canal-all located 
within the United States. 
Thus, the All-American Canal system was built to relieve de-
pendence on the Alamo Canal and to irrigate the Imperial Val-
ley.73 The Imperial Dam and Desilting Works, located 18 miles 
northeast of Yuma, Arizona, diverts and desilts Colorado River 
water for irrigation. 74 The All-American Canal and its branch the 
Coachella Canal deliver this water to the Imperial Valley (see 
Figure 1). 
B. The Need for the Lining Project 
Both the United States and Mexico face water supply 
shortages75 and serious water management problems. 76 The two 
70 PROJECT DATA, supra note 3, at I. 
71 Id. at 3. Construction of the All-American Canal began in 1934, following construc-
tion of the Hoover Dam (now known as the Boulder Dam). 
72 Id. The Alamo Canal was the first project to irrigate the Imperial Valley with 
Colorado River water. The Alamo Canal diverted water from the Colorado River and 
delivered it to the upper channel of the Alamo River in Mexico. The Alamo River flowed 
in a northerly direction into the Imperial Valley where auxiliary distribution structures 
were built to distribute the water. 
73 Parker, Water Supply for Urban Southern California: An Historical and Legal Perspective, 
8 GLENDALE L. REV. 1, 22 (1988). 
74 PROJECT DATA, supra note 3, at I. 
75 See Utton, Overview, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 735, 738-39 (1982) [hereinafter Overview). 
76 Parker, supra note 73, at 8. 
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Figure 1 
The All-American Canal runs 
just north of the Mexican bor-
der. Large quantities of water 
diverted from the Colorado 
River seep through the earthen 
walls of the canal to become a 
source of groundwater for Mex-
ican farmers. (Copyright 
© 1989 by the New York Times 
Company. Reprinted with per-
mission.) 
most important factors affecting the supply of water are popu-
lation and economic growth. 77 
California is projected to face a 33 percent increase in demand 
for water by the year 2020. 78 Southern California also faces severe 
competition for Colorado River water from both Arizona and the 
Indian Reservations. With the completion of the Central Arizona 
Project (CAP), southern California will forfeit use of approxi-
mately 1,000,000 acre-feet of water per year. 79 The Metropolitan 
77 Overview, supra note 75, at 735. 
78 Parker, supra note 73, at 8. 
79 [d. at 31. The Central Arizona Project (CAP) is a diversion project designed to deliver 
1,200,000 acre-feet of water annually from the Colorado River to Phoenix and Tucson. 
Arizona's right to this water was the principle issue litigated in Arizona v. California, 373 
U.S. 546 (1962). 
The Supreme Court's ruling and the eventual completion of CAP will limit California's 
use of Colorado River water to 4,400,000 acre-feet rather than the 5,362,000 acre-feet it 
was using before Arizona had the capacity to divert its share of the river. Deliveries of 
water from the State Water Project have made some of these reductions possible. In 
addition, in 1981 the first 50 miles of the Coachella branch were lined with concrete 
which conserved approximately enough water to meet Coachella's reduction. CVWD Press 
Release, supra note 2. When CAP reaches full operation, however, California will have to 
further reduce its use of Colorado River water by 300,000 acre-feet per year. The MWD 
will be the water agency in California that suffers most from these reductions. 
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Water District of Southern California (MWD)80 was using ap-
proximately one half of this water which forces the agency to 
look for new sources of water.8l 
Furthermore, Indian tribes have developed priority rights to 
use Colorado River water.82 The development and potential 
breadth of Indian water rights have left planners and law makers 
unable to alleviate conflict between Indian and non-Indian water 
users.83 The uncertainty surrounding Indian water rights has 
made rational water planning nearly impossible. 
Mexico's reliance on Colorado River water has been increasing 
since 1930 because of accelerated population growth and expan-
sion.84 In 1980, the estimated population in the border region of 
Mexico was 3.4 million. The national population growth rate 
between 1970 and 1980 was 3.2 percent, and this pattern is 
thought to apply to the resident population of the border area 
as well. 
In short, continued rapid population growth in the border 
regions of both nations will involve greater demands on water 
80 Parker, supra note 73, at 4l. The MWD is a California water agency created in 1928 
by the California Legislature to provide supplemental water for cities and communities 
in Southern California. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, MWD 
FACT SHEET, 1 (Apr. 1989) [hereinafter MWD FACT SHEET]. The MWD serves a district 
of approximately 14.5 million people. Within its district, there are approximately 300 
cities and unincorporated areas. The MWD's budget for 1988-89 was $468 million. MWD 
delivers approximately 2,000,000 acre-feet annually to its district. The largest user of 
MWD water is the San Diego County Water Authority which receives 28 percent of all 
the water sold by the MWD. Under the Seven Party Agreement with the Secetary of the 
Interior, MWD received a fifth priority for the use of Colorado River water. Abbott, supra 
note 24, at 1402 n.48. 
Sl In addition, MWD must look for new sources of water because its consumer popu-
lation could increase from approximately 14.5 million in 1989 to 20 million in 2010. 
MWD FACT SHEET, supra note 80, at 1. Water demands for the MWD's service district are 
projected to increase from 4 million acre-feet per year in 1990 to 4.3 million acre-feet 
per year by 2010. 
82 See generally McCool, Indian Water Rights, The Central Arizona Project and Water Policy 
in the Lower Colorado River Basin, 2 J. ENERGY L. & POL'y 107 (1981); see also Back and 
Taylor, Navajo Water Rights: Pulling the Plug on the Colorado River, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
71 (1980). In Winters v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal 
government's creation of Indian reservations impliedly reserved water for the Indians. 
207 U.S. 564 (1908). These rights have been subsequently expanded in later Supreme 
Court decisions. McCool, supra at 107. 
83 McCool, supra note 82, at 107. 
84 Alba, Mexico's Northern Border: A Framework of Reference, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 749, 
751-52 (1982). Mexico's population increased from 17 million in 1930 to 50 million in 
1970. During this period the population of the border region rose from a few thousand 
to 2.35 million. 
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and the environment.85 With the major surface flows of the Col-
orado completely apportioned, both the United States and Mex-
ico will have to somehow stretch the available supply. 
C. The Lining Project 
The proposed lining of the All-American Canal represents a 
U.S. attempt to stretch its water supply. Judge Rifkind first sug-
gested the project as part of the Special Master's Report in Arizona 
v. California. 86 Judge Rifkind noted that instituting projects to line 
canals would conserve large amounts of water. On March 16, 
1983, the Environmental Defense Fund of Berkeley (EDF) issued 
a report suggesting that investment in conservation measures in 
the All-American Canal system could save as much as 438,000 
acre-feet of water a year. 87 According to the report, this water 
could then be used to help meet the demands of San Diego and 
Los Angeles. 
On January 17, 1989, the MWD and the Imperial Irrigation 
District (IID)88 signed an agreement largely based on the EDF 
proposa1.89 Under the terms of this agreement, MWD will pay 
for specific conservation projects, including lining the All-Amer-
ican Canal with concrete.90 In return, MWD will be guaranteed 
a minimum of 100,000 acre-feet of water annually from the water 
conserved by these projects.9! MWD has agreed to pay for the 
conservation projects because, under the terms of its contract for 
Colorado River water with the Secretary of the Interior, it has a 
85 Overview, supra note 75, at 738. 
86 Abbott, supra note 24, at 1415. 
87 Parker, supra note 73, at 63; ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, EDF LETTER, 1 (Jun. 
1983) [hereinafter JUNE 1983 EDF LETTER]. One of the EDF's principle reasons for 
proposing the conservation measures was to avoid the need to implement the State Water 
Project (SWP). The SWP is a plan to bring water to southern California from northern 
California at great expense to the environment. 
88 The Imperial Irrigation District (IID) is the largest irrigation district in the United 
States, and the largest user of California's share of the Colorado River. ENVIRONMENTAL 
DEFENSE FUND, EDF LETTER, 7 (May 1989) [hereinafter MAY 1989 EDF LETTER]. Under 
the Seven Party Agreement with the Secretary of the Interior, the IID received third 
priority for use of Colorado River water. Abbott, supra note 24, at 1402 n.48. 
89 MAY 1989 EDF LETTER, supra note 88, at 1. 
90 [d. The total costs of the project are approximately $115 million, plus operation and 
maintenance costs of $3.1 million. The conservation methods also include constructing 
local reservoirs, installing gates and automation equipment, and monitoring and man-
agement measures. 
91 !d. 
172 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XIV, No.1 
lower priority for the water than IID.92 As a result, when there 
is a shortage of water, only MWD is affected.93 In addition, lID 
water is used for agricultural purposes and the federal govern-
ment heavily subsidizes the water.94 These government subsidies 
enable the lID farmers to pay artificially low prices for their water 
and give the farmers little incentive to invest in their own con-
servation projects. 
The idea behind the lining project is to make more efficient 
use of the diverted Colorado River water.95 A large amount of 
water is lost in transit through the earthen lining of the All-
American Canal. Constructing a concrete lining on the walls of 
the canal will prevent most of this seepage. 
There are two phases involved in the construction plan for the 
lining project.96 The first phase is to lay a plastic liner in the canal 
to seal the canal's earthen walls. The second phase is to place a 
layer of concrete over the plastic in order to hold it in place and 
to protect it during canal maintenance.97 
The water conserved by the lining will be used by the MWD to 
help meet the needs of San Diego and Los Angeles.98 Congress 
has already authorized the Secretary of the Interior to construct 
these conservation projects and to receive funds from the MWD 
to pay for them.99 In fact, a $9.35 million experimental canal 
lining program is scheduled for completion in November of 
1990.100 The experimental program consists of applying design 
elements in a test lining of a 1.5 mile section of the canal. The 
canal cannot be dewatered for conventional lining due to the 
92 See supra text accompanying notes 36-38. 
93 MAY 1989 EDF LETTER, supra note 88, at 7. 
94 ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, EDF LETTER 2 (Sept. 1985) [hereinafter SEPTEMBER 
1985 EDF LETTER] (reprinting New York Times editorial). 
95 See MAY 1989 EDF LETTER, supra note 88, at 7. These conservation projects may 
even be legally mandated. JUNE 1983 EDF LETTER, supra note 87, at 1. 
96 See CVWD Press Release, supra note 2. 
97 In addition to conserving water, the concrete lining increases the velocity of the 
water flowing through the canal. See COACHELLA VALLEY WATER DISTRICT, IRRIGATION & 
DRAINAGE SYSTEMS REHABILITATION 6 (1984) [hereinafter CVWD PAMPHLET]. This in-
crease in velocity reduces transit time from the Colorado River and increases the efficiency 
in meeting irrigation demands and saves water. 
98 New York Times, Oct. I, 1989, at 3. The lining project offers several advantages 
over alternative proposals to obtain additional supplies of water. See Parker, supra note 
73, at 65. The plan is more economically efficient, safer for the environment, and capable 
of enhancing water quality. 
99 All American Canal Lining Legislation, supra note I, at § 203(a),(e). 
100 CVWD Press Release, supra note 2. 
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demands of desert farmers. Consequently, the lining project has 
required implementing innovative and time consuming engi-
neering techniques. Despite the technical difficulties, however, 
the United States is moving forward with the lining project. 
The problem with the lining project is that it will severely 
diminish a source of groundwater that supplies Mexico's Valle de 
Mexicali and, therefore, may violate international law. lol The 
Valle de Mexicali, an extension of the Imperial Valley, is one of 
Mexico's most productive agricultural zones. The water that seeps 
through the earthen lining of the All-American Canal replenishes 
an aquifer from which the farmers of the Valle de Mexicali have 
been irrigating their lands for more than thirty five years (see 
Figure 1). With the projected rapid growth of the nearby cities 
of Mexicali and Tijuana, the groundwater recovered from the 
All-American Canal is more important to the farmers than ever. 
III. THE LINING PROJECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
This Section analyzes the dispute over the lining project in 
terms of international law. I02 The first step in the analysis is to 
determine whether an agreement between the United States and 
Mexico governs the water in dispute. After concluding that no 
such international agreement exists, the next step in the analysis 
is to determine which principles of customary international law 
apply to the dispute and to examine the relevant works of pub-
licists and jurists. 
This Section concludes that principles of customary interna-
tionallaw limit the United States right to use the water in dispute. 
This limitation derives from the principle of limited territorial 
sovereignty as articulated by the United Nations International 
Law Commission (ILC) and the International Law Association 
(ILA). As a result, this Section proposes that the groundwater in 
101 New York Times, Oct. I, 1989, at 3. 
102 There are four sources of international law, some of which are more developed 
than others in the case of transboundary groundwater law. See Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, Yearbook of the United Nations 1334 (1983). 
In deciding disputes of interntional law the IC] shall apply: 
I. international conventions, 
2. principles of customary international 
law, 
3. general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations, and 
4. judicial decisions and teachings of 
Publicists of various nations. 
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dispute should be equitably utilized under the rules of customary 
international law set forth in the ILA's Helsinki Rules and further 
refined in the ILA's Seoul Rules. 103 
A. International Agreements 
1. The 1944 Treaty 
The 1944 Treaty is a guarantee from the United States that it 
will deliver 1,500,000 acre-feet of Colorado River water per year 
to Mexico.104 The first step in settling the dispute between the 
United States and Mexico over the lining project is to interpret 
the breadth of the 1944 Treaty. The issue is whether the treaty 
applies to groundwater. 
If the 1944 Treaty applies to groundwater, article 10 invalidates 
Mexico's claims to the water that seeps through the All-American 
Canal. Mexico uses this water in addition to the 1.5 million acre-
feet of water delivered annually, and article 10 of the 1944 Treaty 
explicitly states that "Mexico shall acquire no right beyond [its 
guaranteed allotment] ... by the use of the waters of the Colorado 
River system in excess of the 1.5 million acre-feet ... annually." 
Commentators agree, however, that the 1944 Treaty only ap-
plies to surface water. 105 The drafters of the 1944 Treaty were 
probably aware of the existence of an untapped supply of 
groundwater that is hydrologically interrelated with the surface 
water of the Colorado River. 106 Nevertheless, the 1944 Treaty 
does not regulate use of this groundwater. 107 
The U.S. Government claims that the groundwater in dispute 
is not governed by any international agreement, including the 
1944 Treaty. lOS The United States asserts that the water in dispute 
is U.S. water, and that the United States has a right to conserve 
it. The United States argues that Mexico has been receiving free 
i03 See infra text accompanying notes 141-154. 
i04 1944 Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 10. The treaty contains provisions to supply Mexico 
with additional water in the event that a surplus exists in a particular year. The 1944 
Treaty also contains a provision relating to delivery of water during a time of extraordi-
nary drought or severe accident. In either event, the amount of water guaranteed to 
Mexico by the treaty will be reduced in the same proportion as consumptive uses in the 
United States are reduced. 
105 Telephone interview with Professor Albert E. Utton, Professor of Law, University 
of New Mexico, (Feb. 26, 1990). See Meyers and Noble, supra note 48, at 385, 415. 
106 Meyers and Noble, supra note 48, at 415. 
107 Id. 
108 New York Times, Oct. 3, 1989, at 3. 
1991) TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER DISPUTE 175 
use of the seepage water but that Mexico does not have any right 
to it. 
Thus, the U.S. Government believes that it fulfills all of its 
obligations to Mexico regarding Colorado River water once it 
meets the delivery requirements of the 1944 Treaty. Regardless 
of whether the 1944 Treaty applies to groundwater, the United 
States argues that the treaty only entitles Mexico to 1.5 million 
acre-feet of Colorado River water annually. Since the United 
States will continue to deliver this amount of water to Mexico 
even after the lining project is completed, the United States claims 
that Mexico will receive all the Colorado River water it is entitled 
to under international law. 109 
The U.S. position, however, may not be consistent with devel-
oping principles of customary international law. 110 Although the 
United States is complying with the terms of the 1944 Treaty by 
delivering the 1.5 million acre-feet of water per year, this may 
not be the extent of its international legal obligations. Because 
the 1944 Treaty does not cover the groundwater in dispute, 
principles of customary international law may control the use of 
this groundwater. 
2. Minute 242 
Minute 242, the salinity control agreement of 1973 between 
the United States and Mexico, is important to the lining project 
controversy for three reasons. First, Minute 242 includes a spe-
cific provision regarding regulation of groundwater. 11I The 
agreement limits both U.S. and Mexican pumping of ground-
water in the territory within five miles of the border in the San 
Louis-Yuma area. In addition, the agreement alludes to the need 
for a future comprehensive agreement on groundwater in the 
border areas. 112 
These provisions are significant even though they do not di-
rectly apply to the lining project dispute. 113 Minute 242 is one of 
the few international agreements governing groundwater and it 
indicates a trend towards international regulation of groundwa-
109 [d. 
110 See infra text accompanying notes 122-54. 
III Minute 242, supra note 5, at Points 5-6. 
112 [d. at Point 5. 
113 These provisions do not apply to the lining project dispute because the 5 mile limit 
included in Minute 242 applies only to the San Louis-Yuma area. 
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ter. As is the case with the 1944 Treaty, agreements covering 
international rivers do not usually include provisions for use of 
related groundwater. I I4 A major reason for the exclusion of 
groundwater is the traditional perception that it is a commodity 
susceptible to ownership. I 15 This perception has impeded the 
development of a secure and flexible international legal regime 
for groundwater. I 16 
Second, through Minute 242 the United States recognized the 
right of a lower riparian to have its economic interests pro-
tected. II7 In Minute 242, the IBWC interpreted the 1944 Treaty 
to mean that the water delivered to Mexico must be of a certain 
minimum quality. Therefore, this agreement implies that the 
United States does not have the right to use the waters of the 
Colorado River in a manner that causes appreciable injury to 
Mexico. The approach initiated by Minute 242 is a recognition 
that the waters of the Colorado River are a common resource 
and the problems concerning these waters require a common 
solution. I 18 
Finally, Minute 242 is central to the lining project dispute be-
cause it requires the United States and Mexico to consult each 
other prior to undertaking projects such as the lining of the All-
American Canal. Although Minute 242 does not enable the pro-
testing State to veto proposed construction projects, it does pro-
vide an opportunity for the State to voice its concerns. II9 Minute 
242 exemplifies the advantages of reaching technical solutions to 
transboundary water resource disputes, thereby avoiding adver-
sarial dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration or the 
114 Utton, International Groundwater Management: The Case of The U.S.-Mexican Frontier, 
57 NEB. L. REV. 633, 636 (1978) [hereinafter International Groundwater Management]; 
Caponera and Alheritiere, Principles of International Groundwater Law, 18 NAT. RESOURCES 
J. 589, 592-93 (1978). 
115 International Groundwater Management, supra note 114, at 636. Under English common 
law, the landowner has exclusive property rights over the water. The landowner has the 
right to pump water at any time and in any quantity for any "legitimate enterprise, either 
on or off the land." Because other pumpers may take possession of the mobile ground-
water at any time, the common law doctrine has created great insecurity among land-
owners and States. 
116 See International Groundwater Management, supra note 114, at 637. 
117 Bulson, supra note 61, at 283-84. 
118 See Bulson, supra note 61, at 293. 
119 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 55, at 941. There is no rule of customary international 
law that requires a State to receive the consent of a co-riparian prior to developing a 
section of ari international river system that lays within the State's territory. See also FAO, 
supra note 8, at 8. 
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International Court of Justice (ICJ).120 In fact, the United States 
and Mexico are presently exchanging technical information on 
the lining project, pursuant to Point 6 of Minute 242.121 
Thus, neither of the two relevant agreements between the 
United States and Mexico control the substantive issues of the 
dispute over the lining project. The 1944 Treaty does not apply 
to the conflict because, by its terms, it only governs Colorado 
River surface water. Minute 242 does not regulate the ground-
water in dispute but it indicates a trend towards international 
regulation of groundwater and represents an admission by the 
United States that it does not have the right to use the waters of 
the Colorado River in a manner that causes appreciable injury to 
Mexico. The most tangible effect of Minute 242, however, is the 
provision that requires the United States and Mexico to submit 
the dispute before the IBWC. Therefore, the next step in ana-
lyzing the conflict under international law is to apply principles 
of customary international law. 
B. Principles of Customary International Law 
Settlement of the lining project dispute will be difficult because 
there are few accepted principles of customary international law 
governing use of transboundary groundwater. 122 Yet, transboun-
dary groundwater law has recently begun to develop.123 This 
trend parallels an increased demand for groundwater. 124 Demand 
for groundwater has increased dramatically for two reasons. First, 
rapid economic and population growth has forced countries to 
attach more importance to water in general and groundwater in 
particular. Second, improved technology enables States to harness 
river resources in new and different ways.125 Furthermore, 
groundwater is an ideal subject for international cooperation. 126 
This Section discusses the principles of customary international 
law that apply to the dispute over the lining project. It first 
120 See Bulson, supra note 61, at 293. 
121 IBWC Letter, supra note 69. U.S. consultation, however, began after Congress 
approved the lining project and it appears that Mexico faces a fait accompli. 
122 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 55, at 920. 
123 Hayton and Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. 
RESOURCES]' 663, 668-73 (1989). 
124 See Caponera and Alheritiere, supra note 114, at 590. 
125 Michael, The Allocation of Waters of International Rivers, 7 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 45, 
45 (1974). 
126 Caponera and Alheritiere, supra note 114, at 590-91. 
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considers the right of sovereign States to use the surface waters 
of international rivers. Next, it suggests that this right applies by 
analogy to use of transboundary groundwater. 
1. The Principle of Limited Territorial Sovereignty 
The principle of limited territorial sovereignty is generally rec-
ognized as customary internationallaw. 127 Limited territorial sov-
ereignty permits a riparian State reasonable use of the waters of 
international rivers that flow through its territory.128 Under this 
doctrine, a riparian State has a right to use these waters as long 
as it does not cause appreciable injury to a co-riparian. 129 In 
addition, this doctrine recognizes the right of co-riparians to use 
the international river water. 
The principle of limited territorial sovereignty implies that a 
"community of interests" exists among States claiming the same 
transboundary water resource. 130 The doctrine is based on the 
idea that each riparian State has the right to consider the river 
system as a whole. 131 Each State, in principle, has the right to 
make maximum use of the water within its territory. In exercising 
this right, however, each State must respect the rights of the other 
States. 132 
As discussed in detail below, the ILC and the ILA have adopted 
the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty in their efforts to 
codify trans boundary water resource law. The lLC views water 
from international rivers as part of an international watercourse 
system in which groundwater is a "hydrographic component."133 
According to the ILC draft articles, each State that is part of an 
international watercourse system has a right to share in the use 
of the watercourse system. 
127 See Eagleton, The Use of the Waters of International Rivers, 23 CANADIAN B. REV. 10 18, 
1021 (1955); M. WHITEMAN, supra note 55, at 920-45; Caponera, Patterns of Cooperation 
in International Water Law: Principles and Institutions, in TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES LAW 
I, 6 (A. UUon & L. Teclaff eds. 1987); Szekely, Transboundary Resources: A View From 
Mexico, in TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES LAW 211, 225 (A. Utton & L. Teclaff eds. 1987). 
128 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 55, at 921-23. 
129 UTTON, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS _(1991) (to be published by Michie & Co.). 
130 FAO, supra note 8, at 8. 
131 Michael, supra note 125, at 50. 
132 Id. 
133 International Law Commission, Report to the General Assembly, 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 10) at 45, U.N. Doc. A/43110 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 ILC REPORT]. See infra text 
accompanying notes 180-93. 
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The ILA has adopted the doctrine of limited territorial sover-
eignty in developing the Helsinki Rules of 1966 (Helsinki Rules) 
which embrace the concept of an international drainage basin. 134 
According to the ILA, a system of rivers and lakes in a drainage 
basin, which includes groundwater, should be treated as an in-
tegrated whole. Each basin State is entitled to a reasonable and 
equitable share in the water of this drainage basin. The ILA has 
further expanded the Helsinki Rules through the Seoul Rules, 
which specifically focus on use of transboundary groundwater. 135 
Thus, under customary international law, sovereignty is not 
absolute for either the upper riparian 136 or the lower riparian. 137 
The acceptance of the principle of limited territorial sovereignty 
is evidenced by the practice of States entering into treaties to 
apportion waters of international rivers,138 decisions of national 
134 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE WATERS OF 
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS at art. I-III (London 1967) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules]. See infra 
text accompanying notes 194-202. 
135 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTy-SECOND CONFERENCE HELD 
AT SEOUL 1986,231,241-42 (London 1987) [hereinafter Seoul Rules]. 
136 Eagleton, supra note 127, at 1020. According to the doctrine of absolute territorial 
sovereignty, the upper riparian has the right to use the water of an international river 
even if its use causes injury to co-riparians. UTTON, supra note 129 at 2. Prevalent during 
the 19th and early 20th centuries, this doctrine received its greatest support in what came 
to be known as the Harmon Doctrine. See Griffin, The Use of Waters of International Drainage 
Basins Under Customary International Law, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 50, 50-51 (1959). 
In the context of allocation of international river waters, however, the doctrine of 
absolute territorial sovereignty no longer has credence. Most publicists agree that the 
principle has been replaced with the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum (so use your own as 
not to injure another's property). /d. at 59. In addition, no decision by an international 
tribunal supports absolute territorial sovereignty in this context. 
137 The doctrine of absolute territorial integrity posits that the lower riparian State has 
the right to demand the continued natural flow of waters from the upper riparians. 
UTTON, supra note 129, at 3. The upper riparian must allow the water to flow into the 
lower riparian's territory in its original channel. Eagleton, supra note 127, at 1022. The 
upper riparian could, however, make reasonable use of the water while it flowed through 
its territory. 
The principle of absolute territorial integrity is also without juridical foundation. See 
UTTON, supra note 129, at 3. Like the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty, this 
principle disregards reciprocal sovereign rights of States that have an interest in the same 
international water resource. The absolute territorial integrity principle hampers the 
upper riparian's use of the river water and can lead to a waste of natural resources. 
Eagleton, supra note 127, at 1022. 
138 See generally Griffin, supra note 136, at 50-58 (contains a digest of several treaties 
governing international rivers). Over one-hundred treaties govern systems of international 
rivers. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 55, at 934. These treaties indicate that there are principles 
of international law that restrict the power of States to use the waters of international 
rivers without regard to the effects on other States. These agreements provide evidence 
of the general conception of this principle of limited territorial sovereignty. Griffin, supra 
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or municipal courts,139 writings of publicists,140 and decisions of 
international tribunals. 141 
Furthermore, the doctrine of "equitable utilization" has become 
an accepted means of calculating the amount of water each State 
is entitled to use. 142 Equitable utilization is an expression of lim-
ited territorial sovereignty which derives from the concept of 
"equality of rights."143 Equitable utilization requires that the in-
terests of the States in question be fairly weighed in determining 
each State's right to use transboundary water resources. The right 
of a State to use this water carries with it the duty not to cause 
appreciable injury to other States. 144 The idea is based on the 
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedus-"so use your own prop-
erty as not to injure your neighbor's property."145 
The ILA's Helsinki Rules provide a list of relevant factors for 
calculating equitable utilization of transboundary water re-
sources. 146 In promulgating this list of factors, the Helsinki Rules 
note 136, at 58-59. See UTTON, supra note 129, at 5-12. By entering into the 1944 Treaty 
with Mexico the United States contributed to this practice of recognizing limited territorial 
sovereignty and obligations to co-riparians. Eagleton, supra note 127, at 1020. 
139 Although decisions of national or municipal courts generally are not binding prec-
edent, they provide evidence of relevant policy considerations. UTTON, supra note 129, at 
14. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (Court rejects Colorado's claim of absolute 
sovereign rights); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (The upper state may not 
dispose of the waters of an unnavigable stream without regard to the harm that may be 
caused to the lower state). 
140 See e.g., 10th Conference of the Inter-American Bar Association (Every State has 
the right to use the waters of an international system insofar as it does not interfere with 
the equal right of States having another part of the system within their territory); Eco-
nomic Commission of Europe (A State has the right to unilaterally develop a section of 
an international waterway insofar as it only causes minor inconvenience or slight injury); 
Department of State Memorandum (Sovereignty is restricted by principles of customary 
international law); U.S. Representative to the United Nations General Assembly (In the 
absence of specific treaty provisions to the contrary, no State may claim to use the waters 
of an international river in such a way as to cause material injury to the interests of other 
states) M. WHITEMAN, supra note 55, at 921-43. 
141 See Griffin, supra note 136, at 59. Several international tribunals have recognized 
that a State has a duty not to exercise its territorial sovereignty in a manner which causes 
injury to another State. 
142 UTTON, supra note 129, at 33. For a detailed discussion of the development and use 
of the doctrine of equitable utilization, see UTTON, supra note 129, at 21-41. 
143 Id. at 21. 
144 Id. at 22. 
145 [d. at 23. 
146 Helsinki Rules, supra note 134, at art. V. Article V states: 
(I) What is a reasonable and equitable share within the meaning of Article IV is 
to be determined in the light of all the relevant factors in each particular case. 
(2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited to: 
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attempt to balance the benefits to the damaging State against the 
costs of the damaged State. According to the Helsinki Rules, each 
basin State is entitled to a "reasonable and equitable share in the 
beneficial uses of the water .... " 
2. Applying Limited Territorial Sovereignty to Transboun-
dary Groundwater 
The principle of limited territorial sovereignty and its corollary 
principle of equitable utilization have developed primarily in the 
context of States using the surface water of international rivers. 
The water subject to dispute in the lining project conflict, how-
ever, is not surface water but rather, groundwater. 147 Therefore, 
in order for these principles to apply to the lining project dispute, 
an analogy must be made to principles governing surface water. 
The analogy of transboundary surface water law to transboun-
dary groundwater law is based on the physical interrelationship 
(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of of 
the drainage area in the territory of each basin State; 
(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution 
of water by each basin State; 
(c) the climate affecting the basin; 
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin in each basin State, 
including in particular existing utilization;; 
(e) the economic and social needs of each basin State; 
(f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin 
State; 
(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic 
and social needs of each basin State; 
(h) the availability of other resources; 
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the 
basin; 
Ul the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin 
States as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and, 
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied, 
without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State. 
(3) The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance 
in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a 
reasonable and equitable share, all relevant factors are to be considered together 
and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole. 
147 There are two major classifications of groundwater, which may require different 
treatment under international law. International Groundwater Management, supra note 114, 
at 655. The first classification is groundwater that receives its source from surface water 
flows. This groundwater is interrelated with surface flows, and is the type of groundwater 
that is at stake in the lining project dispute. The second classification of groundwater is 
that which is not hydrologically connected with any identifiable surface river or lake. This 
Comment focuses on applying customary international law to groundwater that is inter-
related with surface water. 
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of surface water and groundwater. 14s Groundwater is intimately 
linked to the quantity and quality of surface water. 149 Because it 
often flows underground before appearing in another State, it 
may not seem to have a surface connection. Yet, like surface 
water, groundwater is really part of an international water re-
source system 150 which does not respect political boundaries. 151 
Extraction of groundwater by one State can affect the level of 
surface water flows of a bordering state. 152 
Customary international law should reflect the evolving prac-
tices of States. 153 Accordingly, with States increasing their demand 
for trans boundary groundwater, the doctrine oflimited territorial 
sovereignty should be applied to use of transboundary ground-
water based on the analogy to surface water. 154 Applying this 
doctrine to groundwater would be consistent with the writings of 
the ILC and the ILA. 
C. General Principles of Law 
General principles of law recognized by civilized nations are a 
source of international law. 155 An international tribunal may ap-
ply principles of groundwater law developed by past and present 
societies. In addition, it may be helpful to consider the law of 
modern federal systems governing the use of groundwater. 156 
In most countries, groundwater law has developed separately 
from surface water law. 157 The ancient Chinese water law was 
primarily concerned with surface water, but contained two useful 
concepts for developing trans boundary groundwater law. 15s The 
148 See International Groundwater Management, supra note 114, at 654; Hayton & Utton, 
supra note 123, at 670-71. Although surface water and groundwater are interconnected, 
customary international law treats the two separately. This distinction is contrary to 
hydraulic reality. 
149 Hayton & Utton, supra note 123, at 670. 
150 Bradley and DeCook, Groundwater Occurrence and Utilization in the Arizona-Sonora 
Border Region, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 29, 41 (1978). 
151 Caponera and Alheritiere, supra note 114, at 590. 
152 See, eg., International Groundwater Management, supra note 114, at 634 n. 8. 
153 See Caponera, supra note 127, at 6-7. 
154 Griffin, supra note 136, at 77. See e.g., Seoul Rules, supra note 135, at art. II. The 
ILA's Seoul Rules explicitly apply the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty to trans-
boundary groundwater. 
155 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 102. 
156 Caponera and Alheritiere, supra note 114, at 594. 
157 Seoul Rules, supra note 135, at 241. 
158 Caponera and Alheritiere, supra note 114, at 595. 
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ancient Chinese system placed a high priority on flexibility and 
equity. This system led to the concept of "equalization of water" 
which is the equivalent of the modern doctrine of equitable uti-
lization. 159 
Ancient Hebrew law recognized the right of every traveler to 
use public wells. 160 Water for domestic and irrigation use was 
subject to an order of priorities based on the proximity of the 
well to the user and ease of access to the well. 
Islamic law treated groundwater with unusual detail because 
the core regions where Islam developed were so arid. 161 In Mos-
lem cultures, water was free because it was a common good. In 
principle, everyone had a right to use the water, subject to the 
rights of prior users. Appropriation of a well did not give own-
ership rights to the water itself; it merely established priority 
rights to use the water. 162 Modern Moslem water law institution-
alizes this traditional concept of community interest. 163 
In most of Europe, title to land included ownership of the 
groundwater. 164 Some of the African and Asian colonies also 
adopted this concept of ownership. In most tribal areas, however, 
the concept of real property ownership was not indigenous, and 
village wells were used communally without concern over title. 
There is, however, a major movement underway to replace the 
system of ownership of groundwater. 165 States are imposing quan-
tity restrictions on groundwater use and extending permit and 
reporting requirements to those who use groundwater as well as 
to those who drill groundwater. There is pressure for reform 
due to modern understanding of aquifers and their waters and 
increased pressure on water supplies. 
Many countries including Yugoslavia, Israel, Romania, and 
Turkey have severed groundwater from land ownership and have 
159 [d. See supra text accompanying notes 141-46 for a discussion of the principle of 
equitable utilization. 
160 Caponera and Alheritiere, supra note 114, at 596. 
161 Seoul Rules, supra note 135, at 242. 
162 Caponera and Alheritiere, supra note 114, at 597. In order to avoid the problems 
of depleting groundwater, prohibited areas (harims) were established around wells in which 
no other wells could be constructed. Seoul Rules, supra note 135, at 242. Those who dug 
the wells owned the water, and had the exclusive right to use the water for irrigation. 
These owners, however, were obliged under certain circumstances to share this water for 
domestic use with others. 
163 Caponera and Alheritiere, supra note 114, at 597. 
164 Seoul Rules, supra note 135, at 242. 
165 [d. 
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brought groundwater into the public domain. 166 In Poland, water 
is the property of the State although once it is pumped, it gen-
erally belongs to the landowner.167 Only a few countries continue 
to treat the landowner of the overlying land as the absolute owner 
of the groundwater. 168 Even the States that continue to allow 
absolute control of groundwater have been legislating restrictions 
that reflect the need to plan actively to manage water resources. 
In federal systems like Australia, Canada, and the United 
States, the quasi-sovereign provinces or states have developed a 
diverse field of groundwater law. 169 Some states have adopted 
permit systems while others retain prior appropriation or com-
mon law ownership approaches. In California, the judicial doc-
trine of correlative rights limits landowners' use of groundwater 
to amounts that they can beneficially use on their land and subject 
to the corresponding rights of other landowners sharing the same 
aquifer. 
An international tribunal may consider the modern trend in 
groundwater law significant. This trend is to sever water rights 
from the concept of ownership and to adopt the concept of 
reciprocal rights to use the water. 170 There are an increasing 
number of groundwater regulations and it is generally recognized 
that conjunctive use of groundwater is correct. 
D. Decisions of International Tribunals and Writings of Publicists 
1. Decisions of International Tribunals 
International tribunals may consider the decisions of other 
tribunals in order to apply emerging principles of international 
law. The most relevant decisions of previous international tribun-
als are the International Trail Smelter Case (Trail Smelter Case)171 
and the Lake Lanoux Arbitration. 172 
166 Id. In Turkey, a well owner can only draw the amount of water allowed by the State, 
and only for "suitable or beneficial purposes." The well owner may be forced to share his 
water with a neighbor who cannot draw water from his land at a reasonable cost, when 
the well owner has a surplus. 
167 Id. Under certain circumstances pumping groundwater requires a permit. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 244. 
170 Id. 
171 The International Trail Smelter Case, 35 AM.]. INT'L L. 684 (1941) [hereinafter 
'?rail Smelter Case]. 
17,2 Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), INT'L L. REP. 101 (1957) [hereinafter 
Lake Lanoux Arbitration]. 
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a. The Trail Smelter Case 
Although the facts in the Trail Smelter Case distinquish it from 
the dispute over the lining project,173 the tribunal's reasoning 
may be helpful in analyzing the present dispute. The Trail Smelter 
Case adopted the principle of limited territorial sovereignty in the 
context of transboundary resources. The tribunal held that "no 
State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such 
a manner as to cause injury ... to the territory of another ... 
when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence."174 This principle could 
limit the United States claim that it has a right under international 
law to improve its public works projects. 175 According to the Trail 
Smelter Case, the United States interest in improving the All-
American Canal structure must be balanced against the injury 
caused to Mexico. 176 
b. The Lake Lanoux Arbitration 
In the Lake Lanoux Arbitration, an international arbitral tribunal 
faced an issue similar to the lining project dispute. 177 The tribunal 
173 Trail Smelter Case, supra note 171. The Trail Smelter Case involved a dispute between 
the United States and Canada over emissions from a large zinc and lead smelter located 
at Trail, a locality in British Colombia, Canada. The smelter released sulphur dioxide 
fumes which carried into U.S. territory and caused damage to crops and vegetation in 
the State of Washington. After finding that these fumes did in fact cause damage to 
Washington, the tribunal assessed the amount of the damages and the indemnity to be 
paid to the United States, in the amount of $78,000. The tribunal also held that the Trail 
Smelter must refrain from causing future damage to the State of Washington. 
174 Trail Smelter Case, supra note 171, at 716. 
175 See New York Times, Oct. 1, 1989, at 3. 
176 Trail Smelter Case, supra note 171, at 714. In addition, the tribunal held that, in 
the absence of a contrary rule of international law, it was reasonable to rely on cases 
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. These decisions may be a legitimate guide in a field 
of international law that lacks judicial precedent. This holding is significant because there 
is little precedent set by international tribunals concerning disputes over transboundary 
groundwater resources. 
If a tribunal were to apply this principle to the dispute over the lining project, it would 
find several relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 
(1907); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 
(1945). These cases have rejected the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty in the 
context of transboundary water resources. The courts have adopted the doctrine of 
equitable apportionment which is an extension of the principle of limited territorial 
sovereignty in order to settle disputes between the several U.S. states concerning their 
shares of river waters. The doctrine enables the court to apply theories of riparian rights, 
prior appropriation, or whatever theories it deems necessary to balance the benefits of 
one state against the harm done to the other state. Eagleton, supra note 127, at 1023. 
177 Lake Lanoux Arbitration, supra note 172. 
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held that a French project to divert water from Lake Lanoux I78 
did not violate customary international law. 179 Spain protested 
the French diversion project because it would have cut off the 
source of the Carol River which drained Lake Lanoux and flowed 
into Spain. The French Government offered to return water to 
the Carol according to Spanish agricultural needs, and to create 
an annual reserve for droughts in Spain. 
The tribunal resolved the dispute by applying the principle of 
limited territorial sovereignty. The tribunal acknowledged that 
this principle prohibits the upstream State from causing serious 
injury to the downstream State by changing the waters of a river 
in their natural state. It held, however, that France did not violate 
this principle in the Lake Lanoux Arbitration because the French 
project did not alter the waters of the Carol River to the detriment 
of Spain. 
The Lake Lanoux Arbitration may be relevant to the lining project 
dispute even though it concerns the use of surface water. Like 
the Trail Smelter Case, its facts distinguish it from the lining proj-
ect, but it clarifies important concepts of customary international 
law. The Lake Lanoux Arbitration specifically recognizes the prin-
ciple that international law prohibits an upstream State from 
using waters of an international river in a manner that causes 
serious injury to a downstream State. If the lining project causes 
appreciable injury to Mexico, the United States may be in viola-
tion of customary international law. 
2. Works of Publicists 
a. The International Law Commission 
The ILC has been developing the "law of non-navigational uses 
of international watercourses" for the past two decades. 180 It has 
drafted a set of provisional articles that codify State practice 
178 Lake Lanoux is located entirely within French territory. The lake is drained by the 
River Font-Vive, which is the source of the Carol River. The Carol River flows into Spain 
where its waters are used for irrigation. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 55, at 1066. 
179 Griffin, supra note 136, at 62. 
180 See 1988 ILC REPORT, supra note 133, at 45. The ILC first included the subject in 
its program of work in 1971, at its twenty-third session. It began studying the topic in 
response to the recommendation of the General Assembly of the United Nations (General 
Assembly) in resolution 2669 (XXV) of December 8, 1970. 
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relating to non-navigational uses of international watercourses. 181 
The ILC's draft articles codify developing principles of customary 
international law. These articles are not binding on States and do 
not deal with international agreements addressing specific inter-
national water resource problems. 182 
The ILC draft articles are deliberately general and vague. 183 
The ILC has recognized that each watercourse is unique and has 
special uses that differ from system to system. It has adopted the 
concept of "international watercourse system" to include all trans-
boundary water resources, including groundwater. This concept, 
however, is not designed to "create a superstructure from which 
to distill or extract legal principles." Rather, the concept is sup-
posed to be flexible and applicable to a wide variety of issues and 
the special circumstances of each case. 
The ILC definition of international watercourse system in-
cludes groundwater. 184 The ILC has recognized that the compo-
nents of an international watercourse system, by virtue of their 
physical relationship, constitute a unitary whole. 185 Any use of 
waters in one part of the system may affect waters in another 
part of the system. 186 Therefore, the ILC draft articles recognize 
that States which are part of an international watercourse have a 
right to share in the use of the system's resources. 187 
Article 6 of the ILC draft articles requires watercourse States 
to use an international watercourse system in an equitable and 
reasonable manner. 188 Watercourse States are to use and develop 
[8[ See International Law Commission, Report to the General Assembly, 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 10) 237, 249, U.N. Doc. Al35/10 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 ILC REPORT]. The final 
form of the draft articles will be decided by the ILC at a later stage. 
[82 Hayton & Utton, supra note 123, at 669 n.lO. Customary principles of international 
law are less satisfactory than written agreements between or among the States concerned 
in managing transboundary water resources. For this reason a working group has drafted 
a prototype treaty that would provide for the equitable apportionment of transboundary 
water resources (including groundwater). The idea is to avoid conflicts similar to the 
lining project dispute by the signing of prior international agreements that are fair and 
reasonable. 
[83 See International Law Commission, Second Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/381, 7, 9 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 ILC 
REPORT]. 
[84 1980 ILC REPORT, supra note 181, at 247. 
[85 Id. at 251. Examples of components of an international watercourse system include 
rivers, lakes, groundwater, tributaries, canals, and glaciers. 
[86 Id. at 247. 
[87 1984 ILC REPORT, supra note 183, at 23-24. 
[88 See id. at 24. 
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the system with a view to attaining optimum utilization and ben-
efits from the system. 189 State participation includes the right to 
use the international watercourse system and the duty to protect 
and develop it.190 
Article 7 specifies factors relevant to equitable and reasonable 
utilization of an international watercourse system. 191 While it is 
beyond the scope of this Comment to apply these factors to the 
specific facts and circumstances of the lining project dispute, they 
may be a useful means of settling the dispute. 
Several additional ILC articles may also apply to the lining 
project dispute. Article 8 codifies the holding in the Lake Lanoux 
Arbitration. It requires watercourse States to use an international 
watercourse system in such a way as to avoid causing appreciable 
harm to other watercourse States. 192 Article 9 imposes a general 
obligation among States to cooperate in order to obtain optimum 
utilization and adequate protection of an international water-
course system. 193 
b. The International Law Association 
As discussed above, the ILA has applied the principle oflimited 
territorial sovereignty to the use of transboundary water re-
sources through its "international drainage basin" concept. The 
189 1988 ILC REPORT, supra note 133, at 77. 
190 Id. The concept of a "right to use" water resources is important because it does not 
imply notions of ownership of the resources. In order to avoid the implication of own-
ership, the ILC has abandoned its prior conception that these water resources are "shared 
resources." See generally Szekely, supra note 127, for a discussion of this subtle yet significant 
distinction. 
191 1988 ILC REPORT, supra note 133, at 45. Article 7 states: 
1. Utilization of an international watercourse [system] in an equitable and rea-
sonable manner within the meaning of article 6 requires taking into account all 
relevant factors and circumstances, including: 
(a) geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic and other factors 
of a natural character; 
(b) the social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; 
(c) the effects of the use or uses of an international watercourse system 
in one watercourse State on other watercourse States; 
(d) existing and potential uses of the international watercourse [system]; 
(e) conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the 
water resources of the international watercourse [system] and the costs 
of measures taken to that effect; 
(f) the availability of alternatives, of corresponding value, to a particular 
planned or existing use. 
19. Id. at 78 
193 Id. at 79-83. 
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Helsinki Rules formulate the drainage basin concept. 194 Accord-
ingly, an international drainage basin is "a geographical area 
extending over two or more States determined by the watershed 
limits of the system of waters, including surface and underground 
waters, flowing into a common terminus."195 
Pursuant to the Helsinki Rules, each basin State is entitled to 
a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the 
waters of an international drainage basin. 196 Article V of the 
Helsinki Rules contains a comprehensive list of factors to consider 
when determining a basin State's fair and equitable share of the 
waters of a drainage basin. 197 
In addition to the Helsinki Rules, the ILA has adopted the 
Seoul Rules on International Groundwater (Seoul Groundwater 
Rules).198 The Seoul Groundwater Rules provide special treat-
ment for groundwater and thereby expand the Helsinki Rules as 
they relate to groundwater. 199 Article 2 of the Seoul Groundwater 
Rules is of particular importance to the lining project dispute 
because it addresses hydraulic interdependence.2oo This article 
would subject the aquifer in the Valle de Mexicali, which receives 
its water from the surface water of the All-American Canal, to 
the terms of the Helsinki Rules. Article 2 would require the 
United States to take into account the interdependence of the 
surface water and the groundwater and their interconnection 
with the aquifer in Valle de Mexicali. 
The ILA has also adopted the Complimentary Rules Applicable 
to International Water Resources (Seoul Complimentary Rules).201 
These rules serve as guidelines for applying the Helsinki Rules. 
Article 1 of the Seoul Complimentary Rules requires basin States 
194 Helsinki Rules, supra note 134, at art. 1. 
195 [d. at art. v. 
196 [d. at art. IV. 
197 See supra note 146. 
198 Seoul Rules, supra note 135, at 245, 266. 
199 [d. at 244-45. Article 2, entitled, "Hydraulic Interdependence", states: 
1. An aquifer that contributes water to, or receives water from, surface waters 
of an international basin constitutes part of that international basin for the 
purposes of the Helsinki Rules .... 
3. Basin States, in exercising their rights and performing their duties under 
international law, shall take into account any interdependence of the ground-
water and other waters, including any interconnections between aquifers, and 
any leaching into aquifers caused by activities in areas under their jurisdiction. 
[d. at 259. 
200 [d. 
201 [d. at 275. 
190 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XIV, No.1 
to refrain from acts in their territory that cause substantial i~ury 
to any co-basin State. 202 
IV. SETTLING THE LINING PROJECT DISPUTE 
The United States and Mexico have referred the dispute over 
the lining project to the IBWC pursuant to Point 6 of Minute 
242. The United States and Mexico are exchanging technical 
information at this stage and have not yet begun official negoti-
ations.203 Ideally, the IBWC will be able to formulate some sort 
of a technical solution that is acceptable to both sides. If the 
IBWC is unable to solve the dispute, however, Mexico could 
submit the dispute to international arbitration or to the IC]. 
A. Choice of Forum 
Under the Inter-American Arbitration Treaty of 1929 (Arbi-
tration Treaty), Mexico could force the United States to arbitrate 
the dispute.204 The treaty provides that the parties agree to ar-
bitrate differences that cannot be settled by diplomatic means.205 
The Arbitration Treaty contains a list of specific questions that 
are proper for arbitration. Included in this list are "question[s] 
of internationallaw."206 The Mexican Government could invoke 
this provision and demand arbitration if the IBWC cannot resolve 
the dispute. 
Alternatively, Mexico could bring the dispute before the IC].207 
The United States, however, has withdrawn its consent to IC] 
compulsory jurisdiction208 under article 36 of the Statute of the 
International Court of ]ustice.209 Therefore, in order for the IC] 
to exercise jurisdiction over the case, the United States would 
have to sign a special agreement to be bound by the IC]'s opinion. 
The United States may refuse to submit the case to either an 
international arbitral tribunal or to the IC]. U.S. failure to settle 
202 Id. at 278. 
20. New York Times, Oct. 1, 1989, at 3. 
204 Inter-American Arbitration Treaty With Other American Republics, Jan. 5, 1929, 
49 Stat. 3153, 3158, T.S. No. 886, at 6 (effective Apr. 16, 1935) [hereinafter Arbitration 
Treaty]. 
205 I d. at art. 1. 
206 Id. 
207 See New York Times, Oct. 1, 1989, at 3. 
208 See United States Department of State Bulletin, January 1986, p. 67. 
209 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 102. 
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this conflict would have serious repercussions on its relations with 
Mexico. If the United States refuses to settle this issue consistently 
with international law, Mexico could refuse to settle other matters 
that would have a negative impact on the United States. For 
example, Mexico may refuse to settle the dispute over sanitation 
and pollution levels in the Tijuana River. 
B. Analysis of the Arguments 
In the event that the United States and Mexico agree to submit 
the lining project dispute to an international tribunal, Mexico 
could argue that it has a right to some of the water that seeps 
through the All-American Canal as a matter of customary inter-
national law. Mexico could argue that while the the 1944 Treaty 
only guarantees delivery of 1.5 million acre-feet of Colorado 
River water annually, it only applies to surface water. Therefore, 
Mexico could admit that it has restricted its right to surface water 
from the Colorado River but deny that it has restricted its right 
to the groundwater. Mexico could base its claim on the principle 
of limited territorial sovereignty, and could refer to the decisions 
of international tribunals and to the works of publicists such as 
the ILC and the ILA. Mexico could invoke the principle of eq-
uitable utilization to calculate the amount of water in dispute that 
it is entitled to use. 
The United States would probably respond that the terms of 
the 1944 Treaty only entitle Mexico to 1.5 mi~lion acre-feet of 
Colorado River water annually. The United States would then 
conclude that it has exclusive right to use the disputed water 
because Mexico will continue to receive its guaranteed share of 
Colorado River water. 
A tribunal would probably hold that the 1944 Treaty does not 
apply to the water in dispute and, therefore, that the principle 
of limited territorial sovereignty prohibits the United States from 
acting in disregard of its neighbor. 21o As set forth above, the 
principle of limited territorial sovereignty has developed into 
customary international law as it applies to use of surface water 
of international rivers, and should apply to use of trans boundary 
groundwater. 211 To lend support to its application of the principle 
of limited territorial sovereignty, an international tribunal would 
210 See International Groundwater Management, supra note 114, at 649. 
211 See supra text accompanying notes 147-54. 
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point to general principles of municipal law, decisions of other 
international tribunals, and writings of publicists, particularly the 
ILC and the ILA. 
Perhaps the most important lesson that an international tri-
bunal could glean from the general principles of law concerning 
water resources is the correlation between shortages of ground-
water resources and the need for strict regulation of the resource. 
This may indicate to an international tribunal that, because there 
is a shortage of groundwater in the border region, there is a need 
for international regulation of the groundwater in dispute. 
From the decisions of international tribunals and the writings 
of publicists, two concepts have developed to assist in regulating 
the use of transboundary groundwater. First, the principle of 
limited territorial sovereignty states that the groundwater in dis-
pute is part of a system which requires the United States and 
Mexico to share in its use. By signing the 1944 Treaty, the United 
States recognized Mexico's right to share in the use of the surface 
water of the Colorado River. Because the groundwater in dispute 
is part of the same water resource system, it is inconsistent for 
the United States to argue that Mexico does not have a right to 
share in its use. 
The United States may argue that the water in dispute is not 
really groundwater because its source is the All-American Canal, 
a man made structure. The United States would be attempting 
to classify the water as a type of surface water and thereby cir-
cumvent the application of transboundary groundwater law. Mex-
ico could counter-argue that the water in dispute fits the classic 
definition of groundwater and, therefore, the water cannot be 
classified as surface water merely because its source is a canal. 
There are two generally recognized classifications of groundwater 
which are based on the groundwater's source. The first classifi-
cation involves groundwater that has its source in surface water. 
The second classification involves groundwater that is not hy-
drologically connected with any identifiable surface flOW. 212 Be-
cause the water in dispute has its source in surface water, it fits 
into the traditional definition of groundwater. Therefore, Mexico 
could argue that the U.S. argument is simply distorting the def-
inition of groundwater. 
212 See supra note 147. 
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An international tribunal could rely on the works of the ILC 
and the ILA in applying the principle of limited territorial sov-
ereignty. Although the ILC has adopted the concept of an inter-
national watercourse system and the ILA has adopted the concept 
of an international drainage basin, the two concepts are essentially 
the same. The ILC prefers its terminology over ILA's because it 
believes that its language focuses more effectively on the water 
resource as opposed to the land surrounding the water. Both 
organizations, however, have developed principles which could 
greatly assist an international tribunal in apportioning the water 
in dispute. 
The second principle that seems to be consistent among the 
decisions of international tribunals and the writings of publicists 
is that the upper riparian does not have a right to use its territory 
in a manner that causes injury to a lower riparian. It seems clear 
that U.S. construction of the lining project will injure Mexico. 
Therefore, U.S. claims to the right to develop public works proj-
ects such as the lining project are limited. In other words, the 
United States has a duty under international law to consider 
Mexican interests when developing the lining project. 
If an international tribunal applied the doctrine of limited 
territorial sovereignty to the groundwater in dispute, it could 
invoke the principle of equitable utilization in order to determine 
the amount of water that each State is entitled to use. The Hel-
sinki and Seoul Rules would offer a tribunal effective guidance 
in balancing the factors to determine equitable utilization of the 
disputed water for both sides.213 
CONCLUSION 
The dispute over the lining project is causing tensions in rela-
tions between the United States and Mexico. With virtually all of 
the Colorado River water allocated and the United States and 
Mexico facing projected water shortages, the stakes in the dispute 
are high. Both the United States and Mexico have to stretch the 
available supply of Colorado River water as far as possible. 
The lining project seems to be an efficient means of conserving 
water. By lining the All-American Canal with concrete, the United 
States could prevent over 100,000 acre-feet of water per year 
from leaking into Mexico through the earthen walls of the canal. 
m See supra note 146 and text accompanying notes 142-46. 
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The Mexican farmers in the Valle de Mexicali, however, rely on 
this source of groundwater to irrigate their farms. Thus, the 
lining project will cause serious damage to Mexico. 
The 1944 Treaty apportioning Colorado River water ,between 
the United States and Mexico does not cover groundwater, and 
thus does not govern the water in dispute. Therefore, principles 
of customary international law should control the use of this 
water. According to the principle of limited territorial sover-
eignty, both the United States and Mexico have the right to 
reasonable use of the water in dispute. The principle of equitable 
utilization, as articulated by the ILA's Helsinki and Seoul Rules, 
provides an effective means of determining the amount of water 
each State is entitled to use. 
John H. Coghlin 
